ChinaGeeks.org has been shut down, but a full archive of its posts is available here for those interested. LivingwithDeadHearts.com has also been shut down, but you can watch the film for free here:
We’ve finally released our film, online and for free. Here you go. (You’re gonna want to watch this in fullscreen mode, obviously).
I’ve written a long feature piece for the Asia Society’s blog ChinaFile about abduction and adoption in China and how it relates to the US. Here’s the first paragraph; you can read the rest here.
In March 2011, Rose Candis had the worst lunch of her life. Sitting at a restaurant in Shaoguan, a small city in South China, the American mother tried hard not to vomit while her traveling companion translated what the man they were eating with had just explained: her adopted Chinese daughter Erica had been purchased, and then essentially resold to her for profit. The papers the Chinese orphanage had shown her documenting how her daughter had been abandoned by the side of a road were fakes. The tin of earth the orphanage had given her so that her daughter could always keep a piece of her home with her as she grew up in the U.S. was a fraud, a pile of dirt from the place her daughter’s paperwork was forged, not where she was born. Candis had flown thousands of miles to answer her daughter Erica’s question—who are my birth parents?—but now she was further from the answer than ever.
The following is a translation of this article from Rights-Defender Online and republished on Shenzhen Information Online (as well as elsewhere). This obviously relates somewhat to our film (which you’ll get to see sometime this year), but it also relates to a long-form article I’m working on about how child trafficking in China relates to international adoption that should be available sometime later this month.
Jiangxi, Guixi Orphanage Revealed to Be Suspected of Infant Trafficking
Recently there have been many reported leads, indicating that specific leaders at the Jiangxi Province Guixi Social Welfare Institute and the local Ministry of Civil Affairs have conspired to falsify [records] and are involved in corruption. Even more serious, the social welfare institute [hereafter, SWI] has sold a number of adoptive children at high prices for profit.
Our source reports that the Guixi SWI divides its income into [donations from] infant adoptions, donations from society, government funding, etc., but the income and expenditures reported obviously do not match up. Beginning in 1995 some overseas families began adopting children from this SWI, and each adoption requires a donation of 30,000 to 40,000 RMB. Each year at least 50-60 and sometimes 70-80 children were adopted but the money from these adoptions is nowhere to be found.
From a report titled “Guixi SWI Infant Fostering Situation” it is clear that each year dozens of children were adopted, most of them by parents from outside China, and this report details the names, nannies’ names, birthdates, and adoption dates of these children.
This material shows that the SWI’s “infant director” Hou Shuying is the sister-in-law of the former Guixi Ministry of Civil Affairs director Wu Xiaojing. In 2001, after Director Wu Xiaojing had placed Hou Shuying in an administrative position at the SWI, whenever Hou Shuying picked up an infant from the hospital to bring to the SWI she would demand 1000 RMB, a sum that was later raised to 7000 RMB. Our source explains that most of these babies were not actually found by Hou Shuying, but rather brought to her by an SWI medical office worker named Peng Haiju. Peng’s husband was the director of the medical accident department of the Guixi department of sanitation […] Our source suspects that they were all communicating with each other and collaborating in order to sell children.
According to documents provided by the source, in 1996 the SWI built a “recovery center,” a 2,300 square meter building that actually cost 1 million RMB to build, but was reported by the SWI as having cost nearly 3 million RMB. In 1997, renovations on the “infant department” […] that should have cost about 100,000 RMB were falsely reported by the SWI as costing 400,000 RMB. In 2002, a Canadian philathropic organization built a new infant department of 400 square meters, which cost more than 400,000 RMB but was reported as costing more than 800,000 RMB by the SWI. In 2003, apartments for the elderly were renovated at a cost of around 800,000 RMB, but the SWI reported the cost as 1.5 million RMB.
A knowledgable source who did not wish to reveal his/her name said that the Guixi SWI does so much falsification and fraud that even the cafeteria’s books aren’t clean. According to a cafeteria report document provided by the source, “public recruitment/holiday extra meals” were reported repeatedly, “other fees” were directly falsified, and thousands of RMB were being spend each month on “buying beer.”
The source says that the workers at the SWI are not only involved in corruption, they are also abusing the handicapped children. In order to reduce the SWI’s workload, the orphanage only kept two special needs children, so if additional handicapped children arrived, they would place the more deformed ones in a corner to starve to death, and then call the coroner to cremate the body. If this source is accurate, this behavior is truly horrifying.
The Guixi SWI’s first director Wang Qing and second director Lv Jianming are both employees of the Guixi civil affairs office, along with the current SWI vice-director Yang Dong.Our source says that Yang Dong has also simultaneously held the position of office administrator for the past decade, is responsible for all kinds of [the Guixi SWI’s] services, and is very clear on the SWI’s finances, because each expense report check requires the signature of the director and vice-director.
After these allegations were first reported, investigator Yao Zhengyi [the author of this article] once called together media reporters and legal experts to investigate the issue, and on January 9, 2013 called the Guixi SWI vice-director Yang Dong to confirm the details. Yang Dong said that he was in Nanchang for professional development and that he would pass the report along to his boss. But our source reveals that actually vice-director Yang was not in Nanchang, but rather, was at a friend’s house drinking beer, and he had never gone to Nanchang in the first place.
On Jan 16, 2013, this reporter called the Guixi Civil Affairs bureau, and workers there said they didn’t know abything about the situation, and further said that [Civil Affairs] director Li Xinwen was out at a meeting.
This investigator’s report has already been submitted to the Jiangxi province Ministry of Civil Affairs. As if this writing, the Ministry has not given any response.
A follow-up post written by the same author as the article above and posted to a Chinese BBS forum reports that provincial authorities had visited the orphanage to investigate. However:
Last night at 10 PM I got another call from the anonymous source, saying that after the working groups from the Guixi civil affairs bureau and the SWI had been investigated, the evidence of baby-selling was to be burned.
I rarely if ever do posts like this, but if you haven’t come across this news already, you should read this post from Offbeat China. For the lazy, here’s the short version: dumpsters painted with this message are now appearing around Bijie:
Humans and animals are strictly prohibited to enter. Violators are at their own risk.
Normally, I would write a long, angry post about this, but this time I am literally dumbstruck. Even in the deepest depths of my cynicism, I couldn’t have imagined this would even occur to anyone as a serious idea, let alone that it could get approved and would actually be carried out.
This is an article from our new nonprofit reporting site, 2non.org. We have done several other articles like this, and want to continue doing reporting and making films, but we need your support to do that. If you value articles like this or the work we’re doing with our film, please consider making a tax-deductible donation.
Mr. Hao is going back to work. The mines have opened again, and his family needs the money. He tells us this, but he also asks us not to tell his son that after what proved to be a very short retirement, he’s headed back down into a coal mine.
Hao, who asked that he be identified only by his surname, is a coal miner in Hegang, a mining town in northeastern Heilongjiang province. Like many of the miners in Hegang, Hao is employed at small bituminous coal mine by one of the dozens of private mining companies that operate the area’s hundred or so mines. His mine employs a few hundred people, most of whom — like Mr. Hao — work below the surface.
As an older man, Hao makes 2,000 RMB (about $320) a month doing lighter, logistical tasks like drilling and lighting explosives, but he tells us that young workers capable of withstanding long hours of heavy labor can make more than double that. What nearly all workers at his mine have in common is that they spend their days — or in some cases, nights — in pitch-dark coal mines far below the earth’s surface. Even meals are eaten down there, together, in the black.
Coal mining is a dangerous profession, and China’s coal mines are notoriously perilous. In the ten year span between 2001 and 2011, more than 47,670 Chinese coal miners were killed in mining accidents (for reference, that death toll is approximately equivalent to 11 Chernobyl accidents, or 32 Hurricane Katrinas). Over that same time period, the Chinese government took significant steps to make coal mining safer, and by 2010, China was clocking just under 2,433 coal mining deaths per year, down from nearly 6,000 deaths in 2003.
Even so, Chinese mines are still incredibly dangerous; China accounts for 40 percent of the world’s coal production but nearly 80 percent of its coal mining deaths. When we asked Mr. Hao about his own mine, he told us that it was “relatively safe.” Collapses have happened, but there weren’t many in the mines that he had worked in. “At our mine, there haven’t been many,” he told us, “but other mines have collapsed.”
Hao may have been slightly underselling the point. In fact, Hegang — the town Mr. Hao has lived and mined in for more than thirty years — was the site of one of the worst mining accidents in recent memory. In November of 2009, a Hegang mine exploded, killing 108 miners and injuring 133 more. A subsequent investigation found that the executives in charge of the mine, which was administered by a subsidiary of the Heilongjiang Mining Group, had repeatedly refused orders to cease production in order to implement safety procedures. In early 2012, after a lengthy court process, the mine’s two chief executives were both sentenced to seven years in prison.
Privately-owned coal mines must technically be certified for safety by government inspectors before being legally allowed to operate, but the process is vulnerable to corruption, or even outright circumvention. Mr. Hao tells us that the mine he works in is properly certified. “But there are also mines without these certifications,” he admits. Often, those uncertified mines are the most dangerous.
Even with the recent advances made in safety procedures, it’s clear that China’s government is still concerned about the issue. Coal mines nationwide were shut down for this November’s leadership transition, in part because a major mining disaster during the festivities would have been disruptive and embarassing. In Hegang, Hao says, all the mines were shut down, and when we spoke with his family the first time, the mines hadn’t reopened and he was considering not going back.
His son, who works in Beijing, was overjoyed at the news of his father’s retirement from the coal mining profession, which he knows can be extremely dangerous. When we spoke to Mr. Hao again in a subsequent interview and he told us he planned to begin mining again, he also asked that we not tell his son, who — if he ever finds out — is likely to be equal parts worried and livid.
Both father and son are intimately aware of the immediate dangers presented by coal mining; Hao himself was once seriously injured on the job when a cart fell onto his leg at the end of a shift. But when we ask about other health risks, both men talk about the food (which apparently is quite disgusting, and often covered in soot). Neither of them mention cancer.
According to data released by the Chinese Ministry of Health in 2011, cancer is China’s leading cause of death. Among cancers, lung cancer is now the most common, and lung cancer rates have been growing with alarming speed. The five-fold growth in rates since the 1970s might be partially attributable to smoking, but lung cancer rates in Beijing have climbed by 60 percent over the past decade despite a lack of change in smoking rates.
Coal-burning power plants and coal stoves are among the contributors to the thick clouds of smog that cloak many of China’s cities, and are almost certainly affecting cancer rates there. But as grim as the pollution situation is in cities, miners in towns like Hegang are actually much worse off, even if they don’t smoke or cook with coal at home.
There are three kinds of coal that are commonly mined; bituminous coal (also known as “black coal”), lignite (“brown coal”), and anthracite (sometimes called “clean coal”). China’s production of anthracite and lignite has increased in recent years, but both still account for a relatively minor percentage of the country’s coal production (18.5 and 13.5 percent, respectively). The vast majority (69.2 percent) of China’s coal mining operations, including those in Hegang, are mining bituminous coal.
Unfortunately, studies have shown bituminous coal dust to be remarkably carcinogenic. A 2012 study of homes in Xuanwei, China, found that people whose households cooked with bituminous coal are far more likely to develop lung cancer (18-20% likely) than those who did not (0.5% likely). Men are 36 times more likely to die of lung cancer if they lived in homes that cooked with bituminous coal; women are 99 times more likely. Unsurprisingly, these results are also apparent in miners; a 2011 study of coal miners in Xuanwei found that coal miners also are at increased risk of lung cancer, and that the younger a miner starts and the longer he stays in the mines, the more likely he is to develop cancer. Specific rates varied based on subjects’ family histories and exposure to carcinogens outside of work, but in general, coal miners were found to be at least twice as likely to develop lung cancer as regular citizens, and in some instances the increase in risk for miners was even higher.
Cancer isn’t the only disease coal miners are at serious risk of contracting, either. Pneumoconiosis, better known as Black Lung Disease, kills thousands of Chinese coal miners each year. Other potentially-deadly lung diseases, including chronic bronchitis and emphysema, also seem to kill coal miners at a higher-than-average rate.
All of the miners we spoke to, including Mr. Hao, were aware that breathing in coal dust wasn’t great for your lungs, but none of them were aware that their work seriously elevated their risk of developing lung cancer. Some told us that they had noticed a lot of coworkers came down with respiratory illnesses sooner or later, but some said they hadn’t noticed any particular patterns of illness.
Small coal mines in China are often poorly-ventilated, and there’s only so much you can ventilate a deep coal mine, anyway. Mr. Hao’s son told us that his father and other miners do sometimes wear masks, but that isn’t much consolation:
[The masks] are completely useless. Coal dust is everywhere, you can’t prevent yourself from breathing it […] When my father comes home at the end of the day he is completely covered in black dust. Coal soot gets on his face, in his nostrils, in his ears, in his eyes…sometimes you can’t even wash all of it off.
The soot also gets in his lungs, of course, and with thirty years of mining already under his belt, Mr. Hao — who has not been screened — has a high risk of developing lung cancer even if he never sets foot in a coal mine again. He knows coal mining is a deadly profession, and is grateful to have made it this far without any major accidents. But though the number of deadly accidents is dropping, cancer risk rates climb with each successive year a miner works. Many miners who escape being buried alive or killed in explosions will ultimately still fall victim to coal mining’s slowest and quietest danger: lung cancer.
When a miner gets cancer, or even gets injured on the job, results can vary. Mr. Hao tells us smaller mining companies don’t provide mine workers with insurance, or even regular contracts, so if you get sick, whether or not you’ll get financial help with your medical bills from the company is very much up for grabs. In his experience, Hao tells us, the people who get larger compensation settlements tend to be the people capable of making a fuss and causing trouble for the company if their demands aren’t met. If you and your family members can’t raise a stink, he says, you’ll get less money.
In his own case, Hao was able to get some compensation for his leg injury, but not enough to cover his bills. The company said that by riding a cart out of the mine at the end of the day when another cart crushed his leg, he was violating company policy. Hao contends that requiring miners to walk out of the mine at the end of a shift is unsafe, as the climb is dark and perilous and the workers are generally exhausted, but he still wound up paying some of the cost for his treatment out of pocket. If Hao does develop lung cancer or another mining-related illness, he will likely face the same problem all over again.
***China has made great progress in reducing the number of accidents in coal mines, but it will also need to address the environmental and health risks the mining of coal, especially bituminous coal, produces. In addition to higher risks of lung diseases and cancer both among miners and anyone who breathes in coal soot on a regular basis, and in addition to the clouds of soot shrouding most of China’s major cities, coal mining can have a devastating affect on the environment in other ways.
For example, coal mining is extremely water-intensive, and coal mining operations can exacerbate droughts and disrupt local ecosystems. This can lead to desertification, especially in China’s far West, where coal is easy to find but water is in short supply. Already, wetlands and grasslands in Inner Mongolia and elsewhere have been dried up and destroyed to support coal mining.
Deadly and destructive though it may be, China will not — cannot — kick its reliance on coal anytime soon. Coal still generates 80 percent of China’s electricity, and though the country has invested heavily in green technologies like wind and solar power, its rapidly-growing energy needs have offset the gains from those fields, meaning that green energy development has not really affected the power industry’s demand for coal.
If China must rely on coal, it should continue to address the plague of deadly explosions and collapses that remains prevalent, especially in illegal mines, but it must also push to improve health standards for coal miners. There are ways to do this, like mandating better ventilation, high-quality respirators, and even dust monitors that warn miners when they’re breathing too much coal dust.
The government could also move beyond prevention and attempt to do something for the miners who have already contracted lung diseases related to their contact with coal. Mandating that all companies — even the small private mines — provide real medical insurance that shields workers from heavy financial burdens in the event of work-related accidents and illnesses would be a good start. Lower medical bills will likely be little consolation to the thousands and thousands of miners who will be killed by lung cancer, black lung, and other respiratory illnesses over the coming decades, but it would, Mr. Hao agrees, be better than nothing.
By C. Custer and L. Li, with additional reporting by Jonathan Silin.
2Non is a nonprofit media organization run by humans who enjoy activities like eating and living under roofs. If you think articles like this one, or films like this one, are worthwhile, please consider making a tax-deductible donation.
Caixin’s recent package of stories (which I came across via the indispensable Sinocism) includes this opinion piece by professor Yu Jianrong. He’s a bit light on actual solutions aside from the usual (totally reform everything), but if nothing else, the piece is an excellent exposition of exactly why the petition system “works” the way it does.
How to Break the Vicious Cycle of ‘Intercepting Petitioners’
“Intercepting petitioners” refers to local officials using various measures to intercept people attempting to petition at the [provincial] or central offices and forcibly taking them back to their hometowns. In China’s current political climate, the intercepting of petitioners has long been an open secret, an “unwritten rule” of petition office stability management work, an uncivilized but tacitly accepted rule for government work, and an important part of the job of those who “greet petitioners.” Whenever the two congresses or National Day or some other “sensitive” time rolls around, many additional ‘petitioner interception’ workers come to Beijing to intercept petitioners from their local area to prevent petitioners from staying in Beijing and increasing the number of complaints about their locale on the record.
Reality shows us that there are three main downsides to these petitioner-intercepting activities: first, there is a high economic cost, and this has already become a heavy burden on some local governments, especially lower-level governments. Sometimes, the money it takes to intercept a petitioner would be enough money to actually solve the petitioner’s problem.
The second is that intercepting petitioners has serious political consequences; it violates the petitioners’ basic rights, directly cuts out the petitioning system, and has a definite draining effect on national legitimacy. What’s even more serious is that some local governments have made the ‘petitioner intercepting’ system even more effective by giving “perks” to provincial and central petition office authorities in return for information about local petitioners that makes it easier to intercept them. So, even if a petitioner has entered the petition office and registered their complaint, it’s possible to change what’s on the register by spending money. This is not only brazenly preventing information from reaching the highest-level authorities and deceiving the central [government], it is also creating a new source of corruption within the system itself.
The third is that because of petitioner-intercepting activities, the rulers’ attempts to eliminate social conflicts via the petitioning system are ineffective, and [petitioner-intercepting] can even become a source of new social conflicts. Petitioners are the ones who most directly bear the consequences of petitioner-intercepting; in their attempts to evade the pursuit of local government interceptors, some are ruined in the process, and when they finally reach Beijing or the provincial capital and then [still] get intercepted, they have no one left to turn to. And more horribly, some petitioners are beaten, detained, or even sent to reeducation through labor (劳教). For this reason, although intercepting petitioners temporarily reduces the number of petitioners in Beijing or at provincial petition offices, protecting the “social stability” of the capital or provincial cities, but it cannot address the roots of the problem, and instead it just creates more conflict.
‘Meeting petitioners’ and ‘intercepting petitioners’ ((“Meeting” and “Intercepting” are both pronounced “jie” so this is sort of a play on words)) are both important reflections of the variation in today’s national petitioning system. Petition officers and officials, local governments, and the central government all participate, using the system as a platform for a kind of game in which they attempt to maximize their own interests. But because of this they have fallen into problems [like the three Yu just listed and those below], this can be called the ‘petitioning paradox.’
First of all, there are the many predicaments the central government level [authorities] have already run into. When the CCP first established its regime, the highest-level policymakers created the petition system, with many political goals including deepening the regime’s legal legitimacy, resolving severe social problems, implementing policy and social mobilization, and also controlling lower-level officials in an unconventional way. However, after its establishment, a serious consequence was that problems began to pile up at the central level. In 1963, the Central Committee and the State Council admitted this problem in “Announcement regarding strengthening petitioning work,” and called on provincial level political and Party organs to strengthen their guidance, saying that local level organizations should do their best to resolve problems locally. From then on, methods for investigating responsibility for petition complaints became more and more complex, and more and more severe. The central government was trying to use pressure on local political and party organizations to stem the flow of petitioners coming to Beijing and increase the effectiveness and realize the goals of the petition system.
However, for the sake of their own political interests, local governments used all kinds of methods to alleviate the pressure coming from the central government, which created a shift away from the actual goals of the petitioning system and which has ultimately resulted in a shift of the pressure back to central authorities. The central government wants problems resolved at the grassroots level, meaning that it hopes the local government will actually solve the petitioner’s complaint, but after levels and levels of pressure, the biggest result is that the local government wants to use whatever methods it can to prevent petitioners from registering in Beijing.
Strict pursuit of the responsibility for petition complaints has forced local governments at all levels to make the number of petitioners into an important indicator of performance, so the blame is passed downwards, so local authorities intercept petitioners and bribe officials to reduce the number of petitions on file, and even detain petitioners and sentence them or their associates to forced labor or even jail time to suppress the number of petitioners. It’s not that the local government doesn’t want to resolve the actual problem; some problems are caused by the local government’s poor conduct or lack of action, and others are caused by central government policies that really can’t be controlled by the local government. Illogical power structures and twisted mechanisms of reward encourage local officials to choose the simple and crude methods of enforcement, often creating greater resentment [in the process] and even giving some irrational petitioners a real reason to complain after they have been beaten up.
Petition officials can completely recognize the conflicts and pressures between local and central authorities described above; they use these pressures and conflicts to protect their own interests, even gaining benefits outside of the system, that becomes a rational choice. Because of this, the more oppressive local governments are towards petitioners, the greater the power of the petitioners is. Many people believe the logic of this industry is whatever the opponent (the local government) fears is what you should do. They not only persist in going to Beijing to petition, they endeavor to use all sorts of unusual methods to petition, for example going to embassies and consulates, visiting the housing of government leaders, and even extreme methods like jumping into rivers or self-immolating, creating more political pressure.
The result is that as local governments use even more severe methods to deal with petitioners, the complaints of petitioners become more extreme, creating a vicious cycle.Because of this, the petitioning system has gone from useless to harmful; from reducing pressure to actively increasing it.
If you want to completely resolve the mess of petitioner-intercepting and break the vicious cycle described above, the short-term solution is to give party and government departments at every level less pressure and to untie the petition system. After that, legal reforms would need to strengthen the emergency powers granted to judicial authorities and use the judicial system to clear up old cases. In the long-term, there will need to be radical political changes that completely reform the petition system.
Specifically, it would be possible to collect the currently scattered resources of the petition system under the auspices of all levels of the People’s Congress and use that to oversee things. This would not only give the petition office a new body of authority, it would also give it the necessary accountability, and at the same time help move People’s Congress delegates towards full-time duties and create a new substantial condition [for being an NPC delegate].
Fundamentally, only with political reform and establishing a government with powers that are weighed and controlled, with an independent and fair judiciary, with mechanisms for the democratic election of representatives, and with organizations and channels for all levels of society to voice their interests can there arise an equal and harmonious modern society.